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Abstract
In this paper, we give two formal representations of
the thematic-rhematic (T-R) structure of a natural
language discourse. One is based on the concept of
ontological promiscuity and the other based on a
typed A-calculus.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we give two formal representations
of the thematic-rhematic (T-R) structure of a nat-
ural language discourse. Some pairs, triples, or
in generally n—tuples of sentences in a discourse
may differ in the place of their information fo-
cus. The distribution of this information focus
is called the thematic-rhematic (T-R) structure or
dichotomy. Besides "theme and rheme", similar
terms as "old-information and new-information",
"topic and comment", etc. are used in the liter-
ature concerning functional linguistics. We treat
these concepts formally using two different tools.
The tool used in Section 2 is a logical notation
which is first-order and nonintensional. Using this
description, a proof process of utterance interpre-
tation of a discourse can be obtained. Implicit def-
inition of the concepts of theme and rheme is given
axiomatically. In the conventional logical notation,
it is difficult to represent the information concern-
ing the T-R dichotomy of sentences while such an
information is important for the analysis of a dis-
course. It is shown that this is related to the prob-
lem of ontology. If, how,- rer, we abandon onto-
logical scruples, it become easier to represent the
T-R structure. We use the concept of ontological
promiscuity proposed by J. R. Hobbs. In Section
2, using this notion, it is shown that we can give
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an account for utterance interpretation as a proof
process. It is also shown that the closed world as-
sumption (CWA) is essentially related to the pro-
posed proof prcess. In Section 3, we consider the
same problem mainly for Japanese, using another
tool. We propose to use typed A-calculus to anal-
yse the problem. A logical notation is seen as a
typed A-term. Basic types are T and R. Roughly
speaking, T and R stand for a theme part and a
rheme part of a sentence, respectively. The differ-
ence of T-R dichotomy is given by different types.
Thus the same sentence may have different types
depending on the situation. For utterances, type
inference will be performed. The correctness of a
given discourse can be proved by checking the cor-
rectness of the types of each utterance. In Section
3, we elaborate on this idea. In Section 4, con-
clusions are given. Sections 2 and 3 can be read
independently except the discussins on the prag-
matic problem. The numbering of formulae is local
in each section.
2 Representation based on ontological
promiscuity
In this section, a formal description of the
thematic-rhematic (T-R) dichotomy of sentences
is given based on a logical notation which is first-
order and nonintensional. Using this description, a
proof process of discourse understanding can be ob-
tained. Besides "theme and rheme", similar terms
as "old-information and new-information", "topic
and comment", etc. are used in the literature con-
cerning functional linguistics. However, since we
do not define these terms explicitly, it is not es-
sential which terms are used. In our analysis, we
give implicit definition of these concepts axiomat-
ically. The logical notation used in our analysis is
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the concept of ontological promiscuity proposed by
J. R. Hobbs. In the conventional logical notation,
in particular, in the first order predicate logic, it
is difficult to represent the information concerning
the T-R dichotomy of sentences. We can show that
this is related to the problem of ontology. Let us
consider the following sentence.
John is a student. 	 (1)
The meaning of (1) may be represented by the fol-
lowing predicate logic:
student(John).	 (2)
Meanwhile the above sentence (1) may have three
possible T-R dichotomies. If sentence (1) is uttered
as an answer to the question "What is John?",
"John" is known and considered as a theme, and
"is a student" will be a rheme part. Thus, the T-R
dichotomy of (1) is given as follows:
John is a student.
T	 R
(John wa gakusei des — u.)
where T and R stand for Theme and Rheme, re-
spectively. We annotate a Japanese translation for
comparison if there exists an adaquate correspond-
ing Japanese sentence. Note, in particular, the uses
of postpositions wa and ga. On the other hand, if
sentence (1) is uttered to the question "Who is a
student?", "John" will be a rheme part and the
T-R dichotomy is given by
John is a studen
(John ga gakusei des — u.)
(4) is equivalent to "It is John who is a student."
There is another possible T-R dichotomy given by
John is a student.
R
In the above case, whole the sentence will be a
rheme, i.e., a new information. In the discourse
analysis, the information concerning the T-R di-
chotomy as described above is important. How-
ever, the conventional logical form as (2) can-
not represent the information as (3)-(5). If we
write student(John) for (3), (4) may be writen as
John(student). However, this is not allowed, at
least for the first order predicate logic, since "John"
and "student" are of different type (ontology) and
can not be used as an individual and a predicate si-
multaniously. However, if we abandon ontological
scruples, it becomes easier to represent the T-R
structure in the logical form. We propose to use
the concept of ontological promiscuity proposed by
J. R. Hobbs. In his notation, a prime operator
(or nominalization operator) is introduced. For ex-
ample, for student(John), the following first-order
predicate is defined:
student' (E, John).	 (6)
(6) can be interpreted as "E is an event (condition,
utterence) that John is a student". In this notion
"John" and "E" become arguments of the same
predicate student' while they belong to different
categories. For this reason this notion is called the
ontological promiscuity by Hobbs. Note that (6)
states only that "E is an event that John is a stu-
dent" and is not equivalent to (2). For (6) to imply
(2), the event E must exist in the real world. Let
exist(E) denote that E exists in the real world.
Then (2) will be implied by
student' (E, John) A exist(E).	 (7)
(7) can be interpreted as "E is an event that John
is a student and E exists in the real world". In (7),
E is not needed to be specific and thus (2) will be
equivalent to
(3e) student' (e, John) A exist(e).	 (8)
Thus, in general, the prime operator is defined for a
predicate with n arguments by the following axiom
scheme.
(Vxi, • • • , Xn) p(xi, • • • Xn)
=7..- (3e) p'(e, x i , • , xn) A exist(e)	 (9)
Using this notion, a predicate is nominalized and
can be refered to in another predicate. We now de-
scribe the T-R dichotomy by using the prime op-
erator. We introduce four predicates theme(•,-),
rheme(•,.), p_theme•, and p_rherne•). For ex-
ample, we express (3) as follows.





Atheme(e, John) A p_rheme(e)	 (10)
The first two predicates represent that John is
a student while t heme(e, John) says that in the
event (or utterence) e "John" is a theme and
p_rheme(e) says that in such an e, the predicate
part "is a student" is a rheme. Similarly, the T-R
dichotomy (4) can be represented as
(3e) student' (e, John) A exist(e)
Arheme(e, John) A p_theme(e)	 (11)
In (11), rheme(e, John) says that in the event (or
utterence) e "John" is a rheme and p_theme(e) says
that in such an e, the predicate part "is a student"
is a theme. The T-R dichotomy (5) can be repre-
sented by using p_rheme as follows.
(fie) student' (e, John) A exist(e)
Arheme(e, John) A p_rheme(e)
	 (12)
In (12), p_rheme(e) means that in the utterence
e, the predicate part (i.e., is a student) is a
rheme. Generally, the T-R dichotomy of a pred-
icate p(x i , • • • , xn ) is represented as follows.
(fie) (e, x i , • • • 7 xn ) A exist(e)
AXi (e, x i ) A • • • X ,i (e, x„) A Y(e)	 (13)
where Xi , • • • , X., take either theme or rheme, and
Y takes either p_theme or p_rheme. Note that we
can use another representation to express that the
whole sentence is a rheme. For example, (5) can
be expressed as
(3e) student' (e, John) A exist(e)
Arheme(e, e)
	 (14)
rheme(e, e) can be interpreted as "In the event e,
e itself is a rheme, i.e., the whole sentence is a
rheme". Thus (12) and (14) are considered to be
equivalent. Generally, this observation is stated in
the following axiom.
(Ve, x i , • • • sn)i)(e, xi, • • • 7 xn)
Arheme(e, x i ) A •••
• • • A rheme(e, xn) A p_rheme(e)
p'(e, x i , • • • , x„,) A rheme(e, e)
In each sentence, there exists at least one rheme
part. This axiom can be expressed as follows.
(Ve, x i , • • • , xn )[pi (e, xi , • • • , xn ) A exist(e)]
rheme(e, x i ) V • • • V rheme(e, xn)
V p _r heme(e)	 (16)
We now apply the above formulation to the anal-
ysis of discourse (or text). Here we describe the
discourse understanding model as a proof pro-
cess. Our model works as an on-line reason-
ing procedure. In this model, we have axioms
((9),(15),(16),etc.) as described above. Each cur-
rent utterance of the discourse is also considered
to be an axiom. However these axioms must sat-
isfy several constraints which we call the discourse
rules. We set up these rules in the form of I- A 3 B
(see (18), (20), (26) below). This means that if A is
a therem then B is also a theorem. If A can be de-
duced from the current utterance in the discourse
(the newest axiom) plus the existing axioms, then
B must hold. Here the existing axioms mean the
axioms of the original system ((9),(15),(16),etc.)
plus the utterances up to the preceding utterance
which have been included into the system. If B is
proved to hold, then the discourse up to the cur-
rent utterance is correct, and the current utterance
will be included into the existing set of axioms. If
B can not be proved, then the discourse is consid-
ered to be incorrect. Our system checks wheather
each constraint holds based on the existing axioms
and the current utterance. Thus note that it is not
necessary to number sentences appearing in the dis-
course. We consider a discourse or text in which
themes and rhemes appear succesively as follows.
1st sentence : T	 R
2nd sentence :	 T	 R
This structure is observed typically in a story. For
example, the following sentence can not be at the
beginning of the text.
*There is the bycicle.	 (17)
In English, the use of particles the and a (an) is
(15) deeply related to the T-R structure. In Japanese,
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the T-R dichotomy is well represented by postpo-
sitions wa and ga. Korean has a similar system.
Meanwhile, in slavic languages as Czech, Polish.
and Russian, the word order is free and this de-
gree of freedom is used for the representation of
T-R dichotomy. In Chinese, the word order is also
used for T-R dichotomy. In (17), "bycicle" is a
theme and thus it should have appeared as a rheme
preceding this sentence. However (17) is the first
sentence in the discourse so this is impossible. This
is generalized to the following rule.
(Ve, x) theme(e, x)
D [(3e i )-'e i = e A rheme(ei , x)]	 (18)
This says that if x is a theme of the event e then
there exists another event e l in which x is a rheme.
Note that, generally, a term x can not be a theme
and a rheme of the same event e at the same time.
We can write this rule as the following axiom.
	
(de, x) them*, x)	 -,rheme(e, x)	 (19)
Then rule (18) can be simplified as follows.
	
I- (h, x) theme(e,x)	 [(3ei)rheme(ei,x)]
(20)
Remark: For the predicates p_theme(•) and
p_rheme(•), the following axiom and theorem hold.
However we dot not treat these for simplicity.
(Ve) p_theme(e) D -p_rheme(e)
(Ve, x i , • • • , x.)[p_theme(e) A pi (e, x i , • • • 7 Xn)]
[(lei,	 • • • Yn) P-rheme(e l ) A pl (ei,	 • • • Yn)]
Before acceptance of the first sentence of a dis-
course, the proof system consists of the axioms
(9),(15),(16), etc. and theorem (20). Theorem (20)
indeed holds since theme(e, x) does not hold for
any e,x if we adopt the closed world assumption,
(CWA). Let us consider the following pair of sen-
tences.
There is a bycicle.	 (21.1)
(Jitensha ga arimas u.)
The bycicle is new.	 (21.2)
(Jitensha wa atarashii des – u.)
In general, a noun with particle "a" constitutes a
rheme part of the sentence that appears at the be-
ginning of a text, while that noun with particle
"the" appears in the second, third, etc. sentences
as themes. Thus the logical notations for (21) can
be adequately represented as follows:
(se, x)bycicle'(e, x) A exist(e) Ar heme(e, x) (22.1)
(3e, J!x)bycicle(x) A new'(e, x) A exist(e)A
theme(e, x)	 (22.2)
Here 3!x means that there exists only one x. The
above discourse is correct and this is proved as fol-
lows. The logical expression (22.1) is included into
the system as an new axiom. Then the system tries
to prove theorem (20). By the CWA, the premise
of (20) "theme(e, x)" does not hold for any e, x.
Thus the system has suceeded in proving theorem
(20) and the discourse is correct up to (22.1). The
system adopts (22.1) as an axiom. Next the log-
ical expression (22.2) is added to the system as a
new axiom. Let e 0 and xo be constants that sat-
isfy (22.2). Since only xo satisfies bycicle(x), this
xo also satifies (22.1). From (22.1), the premise of
theorem (20) holds. However, by (22.1) and (19),
we have rheme(e i , xo) for some e l . Therefore it
can be concluded that the discourse (21) is correct.
Sentence (17) at the beginning of the text will be
rejected in the following way. First note that since
"the" is attached to "bycicle", the logical form of
(17) can be given by the following form.
(3e, x)bycicle'(e, x) A exist(e) A theme(e, x) (23)
When sentence (17) is accepted in the system,
the logical expression (23) corresponding to (17)
is added to the system. Next the system tries
to check theorem (20). The premise of theorem
(20) now holds by (23), however the conclusion
"(3ei )rherne(e i ,x)" of theorem (20) never holds
by the CWA. Thus sentence (17) has been rejected
and the discourse is not correct. Our formulation
can be used in the analysis of a pragmatic problem.
To see this we now consider the following example.
There is a bycicle.
(Jitensha ga arimas – u.)
The saddle is new.
(Sadoru wa atarashii des – u.)
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This pair of sentences is natural although "the sad-
	 Aexist(ei) A theme(ei , y)	 (29)
dle" appearing as a theme does not satisfy rule
(20). This is because a saddle is a part of a by-
cicle. However the following pair seems to be a
little strange.
However, from (22.1) and (29), theorem (26) can-
not be proved. This establishes that discourse (25)
is not acceptable.
There is a bycicle.
(Jitensha ga arimas — u.)
?The radio is new.	 (25.2)
( ? Rajio wa atarashii des — u.)
In (25.2) "the radio" is a theme. However a usual
bycicle does not posecess a radio. Thus it does not
seem to be natural that "the radio" appears in the
discourse for the first time as a theme. If there is
a sentence as "The bycicle has a radio (a radio :
rheme)" between (25.1) and (25.2), then the whole
discourse may be more acceptable. In general, it is
observed that if x is a part of y that has already ap-
peared as a rheme, then x can be a theme. This ob-
servation can be summarised as the following rule,
which is a modification of rule (20).
(Ve,x) theme(e,x) D
([(3ei)rherne(ei,x)]V
[(2y, e2 )part_of (x, y) A rherne(e2 , y)])	 (26)
Here party f (x, y) means that x is a part of y. We
add the following axioms.
(Vx, y)[saddle(x) A bycicle(y)] j part_o f (x, y)
(27.1)
y)[radio(x) A bycicle(y)] j -Tart_o f (x, y)
(27.2)
The logical form for (24.1) is the same as (22.1)
and (24.2) is translated into the following form.
3!y)saddle(y) A new'(e i , y)
Aexist(e i ) A theme(e i , y)	 (28)
Theorem (26) and the correctness of the discourse
can be proved from axioms (22.1), (27.1) and (28).
Now let us consider (25). The logical form of (25.1)
is the same as (22.1) and the logical form for (25.2)
is given as follows.
3!y)radio(y) A new'(e i , y)
The purpose of this section is to propose a formal
model for utterance interpretation of the thematic-
rhematic structure of a Japanese sentence using a
typed A-calculus. In our analysis, a logical nota-
tion is seen as a typed.
 A-term. Basic types are
T and R. Roughly speaking, T and R stand for
a theme part and a rheme part of a sentence, re-
spectively. Although we analyse mainly Japanese
sentences, the results can be applied to other lan-
guages. The T-R dichotomy of a Japanese sentence
is represented by the postpositions wa and ga. For
example, the following two sentences are different
in T-R dichotomy, and used in diffrent situations:
(a) Taroo wa Gakusei des-u. (Speaking of Taroo,
he is a student.) (b) Taroo ga Gakusei des-u. ((Of
all the people we are talking about) Taroo (and only
Taroo) is a student.) The meaning of both (a) and
(b) is "Taroo is a student", and thus may be.writen
as student(Taroo). However this representation is
obviously not sufficient for an account of the utter-
ance interpretation of (a) and (b). The NP (noun
phrase) of (a) marked with wa functions as a theme,
i.e., it should have already appeared in the pre-
ceding discourse and thus can be considered as an
old information. Therefore, in the discourse, sen-
tence (a) should be preceded by a sentence that
contains Taroo as a rheme (new information). For
example, Taroo in the following sentence can be
considered as a new information: (c) Taroo ga i-
ma-su. (Here is Taroo.) The pair (c), (a) in
this order is a correct discourse utterance. On the
other hand, the pair (c), (b) cannot be considered
as correct since student functions as a theme in (b)
while it has not appeared in the preceding context.
As is seen from (b) and (c), an NP marked with
postposition ga functions as a rheme (i.e., infor-
mation focus). To explain the difference between
(a) and (b) in the utterance level, we annotate
Ax.studeni(x) of (a) and (b) by different typed A-
terms. Roughly speaking we assign T R and R
to each Ax.student(x) of (a) and (b), respectively.





Baesd on this, if we can show student(Taroo) : R
then we say sentence (a) (or (b)) of the discourse
is correct. For example, if Taroo of (a) has a type
T then by the a-reduction of typed A-calculus, we
have student(Taroo) : R. For Taroo to have a type
T, we impose a constraint that Taroo must have
appeared in a preceeding sentence. Other cases
can be treated similarly. See the following descrip-
tions for details. Thus the correctness of the dis-
course can be proved by checking the correctness of
the types of each formula. In general, given a dis-
course so, S i , • • • , s„ in logical forms, what we have
to show is that (1- so : R), (so : R F s i : R), ••,
(.5 0 : R, • • • , s n - 1 : R sn, : R), succesively. In this
section we elaborate on this idea.
First consider the following discourse consisted of
a single sentence.
Taroo ga imas — u. (here is Taroo.)	 (1)
The meaning of this sentence is:
so = here_is(Taroo)	 (2)
We define this discourse to be correct if so : R. This
is done in the following way: Translate "Taroo ga"
into Af.f(Taroo). We let this formula have either
type of T R or R R when the proper noun
"Taroo" is marked with the postposition "ga".
Thus we have the following translation rules:
"Taroo ga"	 Af.f(Taroo) E so :T	 R (3.1)
"Taroo ga"	 A f f (Taroo) E so : R R (3.2)
This can be writen for short as
"Taroo ga"	 A f f(Taroo) E so : (T, R) R
(4)
In the above, t E so means that t is a typed A-term
component of the logical formula so. That is
t E so iff (Bt 1 :t2 ) t i tt2 = so	 (5)
Here t i and/or t2 may be empty. Thus so E so.
From (3), we have
Af.f(Taroo) E so : (T, R) -4 R	 (6)
The verb "imas-u" allows a neutral description.
A neutral description has the following T-R di-
chotomy:
A sentence of neutral description in the Japanese
language was first found and named by Kuroda.
This kind of sentence has no theme part. For this
kind of verb, we assign a type R and write as fol-
lows:
Ax.here_is(x) E so R
Now by (6) and (8) we can deduce the following
judgement.
eo : Ao, e l : A 1 1-
(Af f (Tar oo))(Ax.her e_is(x))
(Ax.here_is(x))(Taroo)
= here_is(Taroo) = so : R	 (9)
where eo : Ao and e l : A1 stand for (6) and (8),
respectively. Thus so : R has been proved and
the correctness of the discourse (1) has been estab-
lished. To deduce (9), we have of course used the
inference rule of the typed A-calculus given by
eo : a -4 3, e l : a I- eoe i :	 (10)
Note that the type used for (Af.f(Taroo)) in de-
duction (9) is R	 R. In general, for a nuetral
description, 0-reduction for R R and R occur.
Next we consider the discourse consisted of the fol-
lowing two sentences.
Taroo ga imas — u. (here is Taroo.) 	 (11.1)
Taroo wa gakusei des — u.(Taroo is a student.)
(11.2)
The T-R dichotomies of the above sentences are as
follows:
Taroo ga imas — u.
Rheme Rheme
Taroo wa gakusei des — u.
Theme	 Rheme
The NP (noun phrase) of (12.2) marked with wa
functions as a theme. It should have already
appeared in the preceding discourse as a rheme.
The discourse (12) satisfies this constraint since
" Taroo" appears as a rheme in (12.1) since it is
marked with the postposition "ga". The discourse
(12) is actually correct. We now formally state the
correctness of (12). The logical forms of (12.1) and
(12.2) are given as
(8)
Taroo ga imas — U.
Rheme Rheme (7) so = here_is(Taroo)	 (13.1)
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Si = student(Taroo)	 (20.2)
Since "gakusei (student)" is marked with the post-
position ga, and the verb imas – u allows a neutral
description, we have
(3x)student(x) A here_is(x) E so : R
From this we have
(3x)student(x) E so : R
In general we impose the following postulate.
AABEs i :RFAEs i : R
The logical connective A can be replaced by V. Fur-
thermore we add the following postulate.
S i = student(Taroo)	 (13.2)
First we must show so : R, however we have al-
ready seen this. Thus we show s i : R. Note that
so = (Ax.student(x))(Taroo). It is natural to as-
sign Ax.student(x) a type T R since (12.2) con-
tains the postposition "wa". This postposition is
called the thematic "wa". We write this as follows.
"wa gakusei des – u"
Ax.student(x) E S i : T –+ R	 (14)
Thus we have
Qx f (x) E so : R F Ax.f (x) E s i : T	 (24)
where Q stands for a quantifier V or 3. This pos-
tulate means that a predicate that appeared as a
rheme can be treated as a theme in the succeeding
sentences. From this and (22) we can deduce
Ax.student(x) E S i :T	 (25)
We now show S i : R. First by (4) we have (6).
Applying the reduction rule (10) to (6) and (25)
we have S i = student(Taroo) : R. Therefore, the
discourse (19) is correct. We now consider the fol-
Taroo wa gakusei des – u.(Taroo is a student.) lowing discourse consisted of a single sentence.
(18)
This is because "Taroo" appears as a theme but
it is not preceeded by a sentence in which Taroo
appears as a rheme. in our formal description, the
incorrectness of the discourse (18) is described as a
failure of type checking. We define the discourse to
be incorrect if either so : R or .9 1 : R is not proved.
Indeed, so : R where so = student(Taroo) is not
proved since we do not have Taroo E so : T.
We now consider the following discourse consisted
of two sentences.
Gakusei ga i – mas – u.
Taroo ga gakusei des – u. 	 (19.2)
The logical forms for (19.1) and (19.2) are given as
follows.
so = (3x)student(x) A here_is(x)	 (20.1) established that (26) is not a correct discourse.
	
F Ax.student(x) E si :T	 R	 (15)
Therefore if " Taroo" has a type T, we have s i : R.
The NP can be a theme if it has already appeared
in the preceding discourse as a rheme. This can be
writen as follows:
Af.f(Taroo) E so :(T,R)–+ R Taroo E si :T
(16)
Now S i : R can be shown as follows. By (6) and
(16),
	
Taroo E S i :T	 (17)
Applying the a-reduction rule to (15) and (17), we
have S i : R. Thus the discourse (11) is correct. In
Japanese, the following sentence at the beginning
of the discourse is not natural.
(19.1)
Taroo ga gakusei des – u.	 (26)
In the above sentence type checking fails as follows.
Since the postposition ga is atatched to Taroo, we
have (6). Therefore, Ax.student(x) E so must have
a type of either T or R. However this is impossible.
Since gakusei des – u can not be used in a sentence
of neutral description, Ax.student(x) E si never
has a type R. The sentence "x ga gakusei des –u"
always means that "It is Taroo who is a student"
and is used only in the situation where gakusei is
a theme. According to Kuno, this use of predi-
cate is called the exhaustive-listing. On the other
hand, Ax.student(x) can have a type T only when
student has appeared as in (21) in the preceeding
context and the postulate (24) can be used. Since
(26) does not have a preceeding text, it never hap-
pens. Thus it fails to prove so : R and it has been
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We now briefly describe an application of our type
theoretic approach to the pragmatic problem con-
sidered in the previous section. Let us consider the
discourse given by (1.24). We rewrite it here in
Japanese.
	
Jitensha ga arimas — u.	 (27.1)
	
Sadoru wa atarashii des — u.	 (27.2)
(27.1) has the same structure as (19.1) and thus its
corresponding logical form given by
so = (3x)bycicle(x) A here_is(x)	 (28)
has a type R. Next, (27.2) is represented as follows:
easily extended to a discourse that is consisted of
more than three sentences. In this case, the infer-
ence rules used across several sentences are modi-
fied. For example, (16) can be modified as follows:
Af.f(Taroo) E si ,i < j .(T,R)—+ R
Taroo E si :T	 (16')
where s i denotes the logical form corresponding
to the i-th sentence of a discourse. Furthermore,
"Taroo" can be arbitrary term, and thus we can
establish the following more general rule:
Af.f(i) E si ,i < j : (T,R)	 t E si:T
(16")
(Tx)saddle(x) A new(x)	 (29) 4 Conclusions
Here 3!x means that there exists only one x. Let
xo be a constant that satisfies (29). Then, corre-
sponding to (27.2), we must prove
8 1 = new(x0 ) : R	 (30)
Since new (atarashii des — u) allows
Ax.new(s) E S i	 R	 (31)
we can resolve the correctness of the discourse if
xo E s i T	 (32)
To show this we introduce the following two pos-
tulates:
Q x f (x) E so : Rt f(y) Fy E so : R	 (33)
where Q is a quantifier.
( 3Y)Part-of (cc,	 E so : R I- x E s i : T (34)
Let yo be a constant that satisfies (28), then from
(23), (28) and (33), we have
	
bycicle(yo), yo E so : R	 (35)
Thus (32) can be reduced and the proof of the cor-
rectness of the discourse will be completed if xo
satifies part_of(xo, yo). However this is true if we
have the postulate (27.1) of Section 2.
In this paper, we have given two formal represen-
tations of the T-R structure of a natural language
discourse. We have proposed using two different
notions. The tool used in Section 2 was a logical no-
tation called ontological promiscuity, which is first-
order and nonintensional. Using this description, a
proof process of utterance interpretation of a dis-
course has been obtained. It has been shown that
the closed world assumption (CWA) is essentially
related to the proposed proof process. In Section 3,
we consider the same problem mainly for Japanese,
using another tool. The tool proposed has been
typed A-calculus. A logical notation has been seen
as a typed A-term. The correctness of a given dis-
course can be proved by checking the correctness of
the types of each utterance. It is interesting that
two concepts similar to those used in this paper
are used in the theory of constructive mathematics
(r-realizability and constructive type theory).
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